Another Premier League weekend has been and gone, with Liverpool moving ever closer to a first English title in 30 years.
Jurgen Klopp's side are now 22 points clear after their win over Southampton and Manchester City's defeat at Tottenham.
It ended up being a very good weekend for Spurs, with top-four rivals Chelsea, Manchester United and Arsenal all dropping points.
But what were the main tactical lessons?
Before Oleksandr Zinchenko’s red card, Manchester City were dominant and should have been comfortably ahead, despite an improved defensive shape for Spurs in a diligent mid-block.
The key players were Sergio Aguero – who by dropping off the front line pulled the hosts out of position and created small openings – and Riyad Mahrez, who was dominant on the right wing partly because Tottenham left winger Steven Bergwijn drifted infield too often.
Failing to capitalise on their possession and chance creation, the red card for Zinchenko then changed the game largely because City could not adapt to playing with 10 men. Pep Guardiola’s tactics are complex and they could not cope with the loss.
Their lopsided shape - a 4-3-3 but without the left winger - left them hesitant, unsure where to pass or how to break down the galvanised Spurs defence.
Tottenham were assisted by Guardiola’s decision to withdraw Aguero and put Raheem Sterling up front, which meant City lost their fulcrum and the one man able to pull Harry Winks and Giovani Lo Celso out of position.
The two Tottenham midfielders were outstanding throughout, assisted for the final 20 minutes by an assured cameo from Tanguy Ndombele. Spurs rode their luck, but Mourinho got the big in-game calls right and Guardiola did not.
Leicester City were the better side against Chelsea on Saturday and should have won the match; Harvey Barnes missed a simple chance in the 80th minute that would have justly rewarded Brendan Rodgers for a key tactical switch made at half-time.
In the first 45, Leicester’s midfield was flat and static, leading to periods of aimless possession at the back and, more importantly, meaning Chelsea could win the territorial battle and work the ball out to Callum Hudson-Odoi and Reece James.
These two combined expertly, overloading Ben Chilwell with Barnes failing to adequately track the Chelsea right-back.
In the second half Youri Tielemans wandered considerably higher up the pitch while James Maddison came short to receive the ball from his centre-backs, essentially shifting Leicester from a flat 4-3-3 to a 4-2-3-1 with – in an unusual move - Maddison deeper than Tielemans.
Now Leicester could pierce through the middle, their three central midfielders creating a zig-zag passing line that forced Chelsea back and shifted momentum. It indirectly stopped Hudson-Odoi and James from attacking down the right, and directly led to the equalising goal.
As the game wore on the tactical shift became increasingly prominent, shining a light on Chelsea’s problem playing Jorginho alone at the base of midfield. He was drastically overworked, while the visitors were lucky to escape with a point.
Manchester United's clash with Wolves had 0-0 written all over it from the first minute. Both teams are better when allowed to counterattack and both managers knew it, which is why neither side committed enough men forward.
United’s full-backs largely stayed deep and Wolves’ wing-backs rarely ventured forward, leaving Adama Traore too isolated on the right. But this was more about team shape than numbers in the box.
There were no lurching moves forward, no runs out of the base midfield positions. A draw suited both, and they were not prepared to risk getting more. However, it might not have taken much for United to edge it.
Ole Gunnar Solskjaer’s forwards were surprisingly narrow throughout, with Daniel James drifting into crowded central midfield positions to join Juan Mata and Bruno Fernandes.
There was a lot of space on the flanks, it was just United did not work to use it. Solskjaer then doubled down on a narrow approach by switching to a diamond 4-4-2 in the closing stages with Mason Greenwood up front alongside Anthony Martial.
Not for the first time this season, Solskjaer’s attacking lines were bizarrely ill-suited to the opposition shape.
When David Moyes was appointed West Ham manager, many fans were understandably concerned it was a negative move, and that hiring a ‘fire-fighter’ would set the tone for a relegation battle.
That view appears to be correct given how they crumbled after Moyes switched from a back four to a back five despite their two-goal lead against Brighton. At no point did West Ham’s lead look safe.
Arthur Masuaku came on for Michail Antonio and immediately sat deeper as Aaron Cresswell tucked inside, creating a flat five that – judging by the subsequent defensive errors – increased the tension.
Sometimes a relegation dogfight requires bravery, a risk-taking approach that tells the players they are good enough to play at this level. Masuaku’s hospital pass led to the confusion between Issa Diop and Angelo Ogbonna for Pascal Gross’ goal, and then Masuaku was out of position before a comedy of errors allowed Glenn Murray to equalise.
Some pundits will say you cannot legislate for such dreadful mistakes, and certainly that Moyes cannot be blamed. But his tactical switch led to the hesitancy and lack of self-belief that oozed from the West Ham defenders in those final minutes.
As this column has highlighted previously, Aston Villa’s two-man midfield in a 3-4-3 has been vulnerable, and on Saturday, Bournemouth became the first team to specifically target this weakness.
Eddie Howe switched from his usual 4-4-2 to a flat 4-5-1 gave his side a numerical advantage in the middle, allowing the Cherries to outmanoeuvre the visitors.
Philip Billing had an excellent game at both ends, popping up in spaces either side of Douglas Luiz to move the ball in the attacking transitions.
Both Bournemouth goals were from set-pieces, but both were won via quick counters that made use of the extra body in midfield.
Unsurprisingly the balance shifted markedly after Jefferson Lerma’s red card, and yet the hosts (perhaps fortunately) managed to hold on. Howe deserves a lot of credit for his initial selection.