Unexpected, yet perfectly logical. On the day following the defeat in the Spanish Super Cup final, Spanish media and journalists were still defending Xabi Alonso’s “improved” managerial performance—but by sunset, everything had changed.
From riding high on confidence to a hasty downfall, Alonso’s aura as a top-tier manager lasted only 231 days under the exacting standards of the Bernabéu.
They say great teachers produce outstanding students. During his playing career, Alonso was coached by renowned managers such as Rafael Benítez, José Mourinho, Carlo Ancelotti, and Pep Guardiola. Yet at Real Madrid, he became the “underachiever” jointly shaped by these very masters—failing to embody any of their strengths, instead successfully amalgamating all their perceived weaknesses. Was he overexposed, or simply misdirected?
【Not Cut Out for Gimmicks】
Alonso spent the twilight of his playing career alongside Guardiola. After the 2015–16 season, Guardiola concluded his tenure at Bayern Munich, and 34-year-old Alonso was about to enter his final season as a player. Though their playing positions were similar, Alonso’s tactical philosophy did not stem from Guardiola’s; he never emphasized building chances through intricate, layered possession. At that historic Bayer Leverkusen side, his approach relied on short-range combinations to create numerical superiority before swiftly switching play—a concept closer to transition-based football. This season, Real Madrid’s average possession rate stands at a mere 58.8%, a figure that never dipped below 60% during Ancelotti’s four-year stint.
He didn’t learn Guardiola’s tactics, but he did pick up his mentor’s penchant for unnecessary experimentation. Unlike Guardiola, whose tactical tweaks are often justified by player form or strategic rationale, Alonso’s experiments appeared more like desperate, ill-conceived gambles.
In the Club World Cup match against newly crowned Champions League winners Paris Saint-Germain, he pushed Fede Valverde—capable of midfield ball-winning—to the right flank, leaving Arda Güler, weak in direct defensive duels, exposed to relentless attacks. In the Champions League away game against Liverpool, he deployed Eduardo Camavinga as a right-sided winger. The league loss to Celta Vigo became a textbook example of his chaotic tinkering: Raúl Asencio, a center-back by trade, was utterly lost at right-back and contributed nothing in attack; left-backs Álvaro Carreras and Fran García were both fielded simultaneously, only to be sent off with red cards. This disorganized lineup also triggered another disaster: Éder Militão suffered a muscle tear while sprinting back to defend, dealing yet another blow to Real Madrid’s already injury-ravaged backline.
Alonso also failed to adopt Guardiola’s trademark stubbornness—a trait that, while not necessarily a virtue, defines his managerial identity. Upon taking over Leverkusen, Alonso immediately switched to a three-center-back system in his very first match, establishing his tactical foundation. But after arriving at Real Madrid, he lost that boldness. He rarely deployed an explicit three-center-back formation, instead awkwardly grafting its principles onto a traditional four-back setup. Recall Guardiola’s first season at Manchester City: despite the risks of benching Joe Hart and Yaya Touré—and the resulting early-season instability—he relentlessly imposed his possession-based philosophy. While differing levels of club support certainly played a role, Alonso’s tendency to compromise under pressure revealed a clear lack of resolve.
【Poor at Player Development】
Ancelotti, the mentor with whom Alonso shared the deepest connection, not only won Real Madrid’s historic tenth Champions League together with him but also reunited with him in Munich three years later. Ancelotti is widely praised for two key strengths: tactical flexibility and player development. His teams have long shed the rigid “Christmas tree” formation, instead emphasizing balance and adapting intelligently to opponents. He also excels at nurturing players regardless of their profiles, elevating their capabilities through smart coaching. Yet Alonso absorbed none of these qualities.
Under Ancelotti’s second spell at Real Madrid, Vinícius Jr. evolved from an inefficient dribbler into a feared attacker who combined explosive individuality with team responsibility and intelligent off-the-ball movement. Fede Valverde transformed from a raw, energetic youngster into a complete midfielder dominating the entire right half, equally adept in defense and progression. Jude Bellingham became a versatile box-to-box force capable of both physical duels and scoring, while Dani Ceballos—once deemed surplus by Zidane—found renewed purpose under Ancelotti.
But what did Alonso do with these same players? Vinícius regressed within a crude system, occasionally showing flashes with Mbappé but never truly clicking. Valverde was reduced to a utility man, filling gaps wherever needed. Bellingham was completely lost: his technical profile couldn’t shoulder the creative burden of the number 10 role alone, and shifting him wide turned him into a peripheral, low-impact worker. Mbappé’s presence also eliminated any chance of reviving the old front-two partnership with Vinícius. Players like Ceballos and Brahim Díaz, who could enhance local fluidity, were entirely ignored.
In his brief tenure as Real Madrid’s head coach, Alonso’s only notable contribution to player development was promoting academy striker Gonzalo García. With Mbappé absent during the Club World Cup, the 21-year-old Spanish forward emerged spectacularly, scoring 4 goals in 6 matches to win the Golden Boot. In Alonso’s third-to-last match before dismissal, the hardworking and technically sound García delivered a perfect hat-trick, repaying his manager’s trust. Yet García’s success couldn’t explain why players who had flourished under his predecessor suddenly seemed incapable under Alonso. There are still far too many unread chapters in Alonso’s coaching manual.
【Incomplete Authority】
While poor on-field performances might still allow room for recovery, the loss of control in the dressing room ultimately sealed Alonso’s fate. He clearly only grasped the surface of Mourinho’s iron-fisted management style. The two worked together at the Bernabéu for three seasons and witnessed the infamous “spygate” scandal firsthand.
Mourinho, a staunch believer in authority, excelled at molding players into disciplined, unquestioning soldiers through ideological indoctrination. This high-pressure approach had clear dual consequences: it could unlock potential in ordinary players but often alienated star talents, eventually leading to locker-room unrest. Alonso’s handling of dressing-room politics was marked by indecision—caught between asserting his own authority and appeasing the club’s hierarchy, he lost his footing.
His biggest managerial blunder wasn’t failing to manage Mbappé—it was applying double standards. He indulged newcomers like Mbappé, Güler, and Mastantonio without condition. Mbappé, naturally, enjoyed absolute tactical priority as Florentino Pérez’s prized acquisition, granted the freedom to operate exclusively in his comfort zone. Güler, positioned since the Club World Cup as a key piece in Alonso’s midfield rebuild, was shuffled across roles—defensive mid, attacking mid, right winger—only to lose his identity as the season progressed. Mastantonio received even more excessive favoritism: the 18-year-old Argentine winger was handed far more minutes than his performance warranted, long before he’d adapted to European intensity. It’s unclear whether this stemmed from genuine belief in their potential or mere compliance with the board’s demand to feature expensive young signings.
In stark contrast to this indulgence was Alonso’s cold treatment of veteran contributors. The first-leg Clásico victory, which should have cemented his standing, instead exposed tensions when he substituted Vinícius as early as the 70th minute—an unambiguous signal of their rift. Already uneasy in his relationship with Mbappé, Vinícius later escalated matters publicly, stating their relationship had reached a point of “him or me.” Bellingham, struggling with shoulder issues and lacking match sharpness, was surprisingly started in the Madrid derby, only to be scapegoated by Alonso post-match for being “unprepared.” Rodrygo’s case was even more ironic: frozen out early in the season, he suddenly became indispensable after breaking his goal drought against Manchester City.
This glaring mismatch between contribution and treatment left Alonso’s Bernabéu legacy in an awkward limbo. If one were to find a fitting comparison, it would be none other than Benítez—coincidentally, another former manager of Alonso’s.
As Real Madrid head coaches, Alonso and Benítez share striking similarities: both Spaniards, both averaging 2.24 points per game, both lost to Barcelona, both faced dressing-room crises, and both lasted only half a season.
Among Alonso’s mentors, Benítez—now plying his trade in Greece—is arguably the least successful. For Alonso, currently labeled a “struggling student” at the Bernabéu, the immediate priority before becoming a true elite manager is to avoid retracing the “Master Benítez” path.
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Rmulbah1992
13
ALONSO MAKE THE WRONG CHOICE BY ACCEPTING MADRID APPOINTMENTS TOO EARLY IN HIS COACHING CAREER'S.