Manchester City might be the ultimate chameleon team.
Jurgen Klopp put it well after his Liverpool side had been knocked out of the last 16 of the Carabao Cup by City just before Christmas.
“We all know with City,” he said. “Different ideas for different games and you always have to get used to it during the game. You never know exactly what will happen.”
But while opposing managers are trying to find solutions to facing City — either by studying what has happened previously or adapting to what is going on in front of their eyes — Guardiola and his staff have also been busy searching for answers to problems they have been posed.
City's possession game has been heavily tested away in the last few weeks, first at Elland Road and then at Stamford Bridge. Leeds United's approach with a narrow 4-3-3 out of possession made it harder for City to access their No 10s — Kevin De Bruyne and Ilkay Gundogan — in their 3-2-4-1 shape when they had the ball.
The thing about City, however, is that even if you stop them in one phase, they can beat you in other ones. Limiting City's threat in the possession phase did not stop the City train on the transitions, and Leeds were fortunate to only concede once in the first half — unsurprisingly, from a transition.
Then at Stamford Bridge, Graham Potter used a similar approach without the ball that nullified City for the first half. In the second, however, Guardiola adjusted and City were the better side after introducing Rico Lewis and keeping Rodri in midfield when they didn't have the ball.
Lewis' role in the double pivot of the 3-2-4-1 was more daring than Bernardo Silva, and the youngster's forward movement provided an overload on the right side. That, along with City's improved pressing and counter-pressing in the second half, brought Guardiola's side an important win after they had dropped points against Everton.
Three days after that Chelsea league game, they faced each other in the third round of the FA Cup. Again, City started with the same shape when they had the ball — a 3-2-4-1 with Sergio Gomez moving inside to partner Rodri in the double pivot.
And Chelsea continued with the narrow 4-3-3 when they didn't have the ball, with Mason Mount and Hakim Ziyech marking City's double pivot in front of the midfield three.
This time, City were prepared. After eight minutes, they changed their shape in possession, dropping Bernardo next to Rodri and stretching the play with Gomez and Kyle Walker acting as wide full-backs. They moved from a 3-2-4-1 to a 4-2-4/4-2-3-1 when they were in possession.
This was an excellent solution against Chelsea's narrow 4-3-3 — Mount and Ziyech were still marking City's two deeper midfielders, leaving space out wide for City's full-backs. They had time on the ball because Chelsea's midfield three couldn't afford being stretched for fear of City playing through them.
Accordingly, City managed to switch the play from one side to the other with the full-backs under no pressure to perform the next action. Here, Aymeric Laporte plays the ball towards Walker on the right side and you can spot Mateo Kovacic's initial position…
…which allows Walker to receive the ball comfortably under no pressure.
Then, when City wanted to switch the ball to the other side, it was the same scenario. In this next grab, Gomez is in acres of space because Conor Gallagher is positioned infield to maintain the compactness of Chelsea's midfield three. So when Manuel Akanji plays the diagonal…
… Gomez can comfortably control the ball with Gallagher still moving across the pitch to defend.
The wide positioning of Walker and Gomez proved troublesome for Chelsea on more than one occasion. In this example, Gallagher sticks to his midfield position and ignores Gomez out wide…
… so when Cole Palmer (light blue) moves into the space vacated by Bashir Humphreys — who moves up to mark Phil Foden — Trevoh Chalobah is left in a two-versus-one situation.
Palmer is running behind him (light blue) and Gomez is making a free run in front of him (yellow). Chalobah's body orientation says it all — he doesn't know whether to adjust his body shape for the ball towards Gomez or the one towards Palmer. Laporte goes for the latter, playing a pass behind Chalobah…
…and Palmer should score from this position.
In another example, Lewis Hall (No 67) is in a narrow position to maintain the compactness of Chelsea's defensive line but Walker is making a run down the right touchline. Near the centre circle, Kovacic isn't even aware of what's happening behind him, whether that's Riyad Mahrez floating into space or Walker providing the width.
Rodri notices Walker's run and passes out to the England right-back…
…who comfortably controls it because Hall can't move up to press him due to the presence of Mahrez. Kovacic, meanwhile, is late to the party.
As a result, Walker has enough time and space to pick out a City player. He opts to play the ball into the marked Foden, rather than Julian Alvarez, who has made a free run into the box. Choosing the Argentinian could have resulted in a better chance for City.
Throughout the first half, Walker and Gomez were free to receive the ball out wide. Here, Kovacic is nowhere near Walker — who is calling for the switch of play — with the ball on the other side. So, when Rodri plays the ball back to Akanji…
…the Swiss defender can easily find Walker because Kovacic is far away and Hall cannot commit because of the threat of Mahrez behind him.
Once Walker has the ball on this side and Hall moves up, the Chelsea defence has to shift across to cover. This creates a gap on the other side of the field, which is made bigger by Gallagher moving inside to defend the centre of the pitch and Gomez keeping his wide position on the left. After City circulate the ball on the right…
…they switch it to the left, and Gallagher is miles away from Gomez.
He receives the ball with no Chelsea player pressing him. From this attack down the left side, City win the corner that leads to their first penalty, which Alvarez scores.
City's third goal, a 17-pass move that ended with a Walker cutback into Foden was also a result of the switching of play from one side to the other.
In the build-up to the goal, City are starting the attack down the right side while, on the other side, Gomez is keeping his wide position with Gallagher near the centre circle.
So when Walker dribbles past Hall, the switch of play is on because Ziyech is marking Rodri and Gallagher is in midfield. Both are far away from Gomez on the left.
City maintain possession for a couple of seconds, so Kovacic moves inside to protect the centre of the pitch. Yet again, because of this narrow positioning and Mount's move to mark Bernardo, Walker is free and signals for the switch of play towards City's right side.
Rodri acknowledges and plays the ball into Mahrez as Walker starts his forward run.
That run puts Hall in a two-versus-one scenario as Kovacic can't track back all this distance from his narrow midfield position. Mahrez then finds Walker's run…
…and the City defender pulls the ball back for Foden to score City's third and effectively end the game.
At half-time, Potter switched to a back five to limit City's switches of play into their full-backs but it was too late. The game was already over.
Guardiola's City are famous for their in-game adaptations. Starting with a certain shape, then switching midway through the game. Or switching the players around to provide different solutions. It gives them an advantage whenever they need one.
Perhaps Klopp missed a line. Different ideas for different games, and different ideas inside the same game.
Although he was right about one thing: with City, you never know exactly what will happen.
(Top photo: BBC Sport)