Liverpool have been a shadow of their former selves at both ends of the pitch this season.
The Athletic has extensively analysed the defensive struggles Jurgen Klopp's side have faced, whether that be sub-par performances from the back line or structural issues within the midfield.
Liverpool have been one of the strongest transitional sides in Europe under Klopp, regularly suffocating opponents before they could look up to pick a pass — let alone generate an attack on Liverpool's goal.
Recently, that fear factor has vanished and opponents are able to counter-attack Liverpool with ease. The organised counter-pressing chaos Klopp has instilled is now just, well… chaos.
It is often a domino effect of errors, where failure to close down the opponent in the middle third leaves Liverpool's high defensive line horribly exposed.
Against Arsenal last weekend, Liverpool are in a decent 4-3-3 shape out of possession, but none of the three Liverpool players closing down Granit Xhaka are anywhere near tight enough to press effectively — allowing him to look up and pick his pass.
The second mistake is from Trent Alexander-Arnold, whose defensive positioning is leaving space in behind for Gabriel Martinelli to exploit.
A simple pass from Xhaka allows Martinelli to carry the ball into Liverpool's penalty area uncontested — with Liverpool's defensive line horribly misshapen.
It doesn't take a coach with a UEFA Pro Licence to see that the gaps between centre-backs — or centre-back and full-back — are far too wide for opponents to exploit. Unfortunately for Klopp, this is not an uncommon occurrence.
Just days earlier against Chelsea, you can see a similar example where Liverpool are not aggressive enough in a transitional moment.
The midfield trio of Fabinho, Jordan Henderson and Curtis Jones gather around the ball but do not pounce with enough intensity — a symptom of their entire season. As Ibrahima Konate steps out from centre-back, there are four Liverpool players to Chelsea's two — yet still no red shirt recovers the ball.
Konate's front-foot defending is a key strength of his, but when there is little protection behind him, that is when those gaps appear. As the ball falls to N'Golo Kante, there is a gaping area for Kai Havertz to run into between Joel Matip and Kostas Tsimikas and face up against Alisson in a one-on-one.
The examples could go on and a glance at the numbers does not make for better viewing.
No Premier League side has conceded more shots from fast breaks — an attempt created after the opponents quickly turns defence into attack after winning the ball in their own half — than Liverpool's 22 (0.76 per 90).
As a similar proxy of counter-attacking, Liverpool's direct attacks conceded — a possession that starts in the opponents' defensive half and results in a shot or touch inside the opposition penalty area within 15 seconds — is the highest of any side in the Premier League (3.3 per 90), with the average trend as high as it has been for the previous three seasons.
While Liverpool's core principles are based on high-pressing and condensing space for the opposition, they are currently doing neither as effectively as they should.
If that well-oiled machine is just slightly out of time, the system splutters and malfunctions.
So, how could we give the machine a new lease of life? One option is to change the structure.
Klopp has been wedded to a 4-3-3 for the majority of his Liverpool reign but there have been a smattering of formation tweaks this season in an attempt to regain a winning formula.
A 4-2-3-1 and a 4-4-2 were trialled to varying degrees of success earlier in the season, with last weekend's clash with Arsenal seeing a 3-2-2-3 structure in possession with Trent Alexander-Arnold inverting into midfield from full-back.
One notable advantage to this structure was that it allowed Liverpool to find Mohamed Salah in more isolated areas against Arsenal's defence.
“It opened up different opportunities for us,” said Klopp after the game. “If you watch it back you will see that it will have to be learned when to use it. Hendo was not wide, stayed inside. Then we could really pass first pass down to Mo. Mo kept the ball really well and we could go from there.”
However, there were some teething issues with this system out of possession, with Liverpool unable to stave off those direct opponent attacks in behind.
With Klopp clearly open to the idea of change, allow The Athletic to plonk another option on the table — should Liverpool consider moving to a 3-5-2 formation?
Here are three reasons this could work for Liverpool…
Protection against the counter-attack
With the openness of Liverpool's back line during counter-attacks, Klopp's men have been far too kind in allowing their opponents to have high-quality efforts on goal — shown by their xG (expected goals) per shot conceded (0.14) being the highest in the Premier League.
With Robertson and Alexander-Arnold key weapons in Liverpool's attack, the space for the opponent to exploit is often in the vacated wide areas. This forces Liverpool's centre-backs to pull across and leave their partner alone to defend the penalty area alongside the far-side full-back.
This is precisely how Liverpool conceded their second goal against Arsenal at the weekend.
A back three would allow Liverpool to keep Robertson and Alexander-Arnold high and wide, with the protection of a further centre-back to cover those gaps vacated on the flanks.
With Fabinho's form ebbing and flowing this season, the protection of the back line has simply been lacking from midfield. Among the ongoing midfield issues facing Liverpool, an extra body across the defensive line could leave Liverpool less exposed in transition.
This has advantages in and out of possession, with Konate and Joel Matip — as the leading candidates for the outer centre-back roles — being two of the best front-foot centre-backs in the league in stepping out and getting tight to their opposite number in one-on-one situations.
In build-up, both Konate and Matip — but Matip in particular — are adept at carrying the ball out of defence and starting attacks, with Virgil van Dijk much more suited to his “orchestrator” role from the centre of defence.
Maximise the strength of Liverpool's full-backs
While a move to a 3-5-2 might sound like a defensive formation, its strengths also lie in providing a more potent attack.
Much has been made of Alexander-Arnold's defensive acumen and while there is truth to the argument, the 24-year-old's strength is his world-class delivery in attacking phases — so why not maximise those strengths?
Alexander-Arnold has been notably less adventurous going forward this season. While his overall touches per 90 have hardly deviated from last season, Alexander-Arnold is taking significantly more touches in his own half and is far less potent from that right half-space that was so integral towards his 12 Premier League assists in 2021-22.
A move to a back three would naturally mean Alexander-Arnold's starting position would be higher up, which would have two advantages.
The first is that it would allow him to stay high and pin the opposition wingers or full-backs towards their own goal. The second is that he would have less one-on-one defending to contend with, allowing Konate to shift across more readily to cover the space in wide areas.
If we needed reminding, Alexander-Arnold's delivery for Liverpool's equaliser against Arsenal showed how potent he can be when given the freedom to stay in advanced areas of the pitch.
While his inverted role from full-back was interesting at the weekend, it is unlikely to suit Liverpool — or Alexander-Arnold — in the same way as it is implemented with Arsenal and Manchester City, given they will still play with three nominal centre-halves (Arsenal — Gabriel, Saliba, White; City — Akanji, Dias, Ake) when their respective full-back inverts during their build-up phase.
For Robertson, Scotland's captain is familiar with a wing-back role for his country, with manager Steve Clarke settling on a back-three system after his first 10 games in charge.
While there have been teething issues for the national side — where Robertson's strengths of running onto the ball were not maximised — it would still be a role that would require less adaptation on Liverpool's left side.
Get Liverpool's forwards into lucrative areas more regularly
Liverpool's shift to a 3-2-2-3 structure in possession allowed Salah to get nine shots away against Arsenal, which was more than any Premier League game since he joined.
This shows how a change in structure allowed one of Liverpool's best players to find himself in more dangerous areas. They should probably do that more often.
(Photo: Nick Potts/PA Images via Getty Images)
A move to a 3-5-2 could have similar advantages from an attacking perspective as it would allow Liverpool to essentially maintain a front five across the full width of the pitch.
Within a midfield three, Cody Gakpo could play as an attacking midfielder — in a similar way he did for the Netherlands under Louis van Gaal — as a central presence flanked by two split strikers, with the wing-backs pushing on.
This could also benefit Darwin Nunez.
Nunez has shown he's capable of playing as a left winger, but the Uruguayan is not the nimble, quick-footed winger who is likely to hug the touchline in the mould of Luis Diaz.
Instead, Nunez thrives with space to attack, bulldozing through opponents with his power and speed. Therefore, a more narrow starting position would be more suited to his skill set — including his aerial presence, which would benefit from Alexander-Arnold's crosses from higher up the field.
For Salah on the right side, Liverpool would still benefit from those lucrative triangles that have been a theme across Klopp's tenure, rotating to find pockets of space and disrupting the opposition back line.
More options going forward and more solidity at the back? Sounds like a no-brainer.
Of course, there are advantages and disadvantages to any tactical system and Liverpool would face similar teething issues if they were to make such a sudden shift.
However, such a proposition might not be Plan A for Klopp's side but could be a handy Plan B to have up the sleeve from the start or an option to switch to within the game.
Either way, Liverpool need to find a way to be a little less predictable in the final weeks of the season.
Don't knock it until you've tried it.